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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as 
a forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 





















































































































































































FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) by the Council of the European 
Communities in 1985 established for the first time an unequivocal authority for the EC to 
regulate in environmental matters. The SEA's timetable for economic integration by 1992, 
together with its companion goal of integrating environmental protection requirements with 
other Community policies, has set the stage for the EC to assume a more active and 
complex role in environmental affairs. The increased engagement of supranational 
legislation with the dynamic, diverse, and often sophisticated bodies of law prevailing in EC 
member-states, raises questions of balance and function with compelling parallels in the US 
federal system, in particular with the evolving relationship of the US federal and state 
governments in regulating environmental matters.
With the premise that the US federal-state experience can be instructive as the EC 
assumes a more intensive and integrated environmental role, this paper presents an analysis 
of federal-state relations under three US environmental statutes. It begins with some 
general and theoretical observations on the federal-state partnership, and then describes the 
allocation of governmental functions under specific provisions of the US Clean Water Act, 
Clean Air Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act—the comprehensive US law 
for hazardous waste management and disposal.
The three statutory programs examined herein reflect highly specific Congressional 
judgments as to the proper role of the federal and state governments in regulating various 
types of pollution. But they have a broader application as well, with respect to the 
perceived strengths and weaknesses of state governments in implementing environmental 
requirements, and to the desirability of uniform national standards-indeed even to what is 
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II. THE US FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP
A. Federal-State Relations are Program-Specific
At the outset, it must be recognized that no single, idealized concept of a federal- 
state relationship prevails under US environmental statutes. The intended level of federal 
involvement, and the precise role of the states, varies enormously among the federal laws. 
Moreover, these functions typically vary within a single statute, so that an inquiry is best 
directed to a particular provision or "program" within a statute.
In this respect, a federal-state relationship under a given statute can be said to be 
"program-specific"—the term "program" denoting some functional subset of a statute that 
strikes a unique balance between the roles played by the federal and state governments. 
Examples of such "program" subsets include the State Implementation Plan (SIP) provisions 
of the Clean Air Act, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permitting provisions of the Clean Water Act, and the Underground Storage Tank 
provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Each of these 
programs embodies a different federal-state relationship, reflecting a different Congressional 
intent with respect to the desired nature and extent of state participation.
B. Functional Analysis as a Starting Point
Despite the variable nature of the federal-state partnership within and among federal 
statutes, certain norms prevail, and the roles assigned can be grouped loosely according to 
administrative function. Principal "functions" include standard-setting, permit-issuance, 
enforcement, planning, monitoring, and other implementation activities.
Under US federal statutes, these functions typically are allocated either to the 
federal or to the state agency charged with administering the law. Often the federal 
government is initially charged with administering some aspect of a program, e.g.,
permit issuance, but with the intent that it be taken over by the state at the earliest time 
the state can demonstrate a competence to do so. In some cases, however, such as 
enforcement, a function can remain shared, with an intended level of redundancy, but with 
the state having the first opportunity to respond.
Some program-specific examples of functional allocations include standard-setting 
under RCRA's hazardous waste subchapter, which rests exclusively with the federal agency 
(US EPA); water quality standard-setting under the Clean Water Act, which is allocated in 
the first instance to the states; and pollutant discharge permitting under the Clean Water 
Act, which transfers to the states only upon approval of a state program submitted 




























































































C. Functional Allocation in a Historical Context
Functional descriptions such as those listed above have considerable utility- asTf 
starting point for more in-depth analysis. The allocations often reflect a considered 
Congressional policy choice regarding the appropriate roles of the federal and the state 
agencies. In seeking to characterize the federal-state relationship, however, such 
quantitative analyses are ultimately simplistic. A valuable qualitative perspective can be 
gained by considering the historical circumstances leading to enactment of the federal 
statute.
Federal environmental statutes, drafted in the late 1960s and early 1970s, frequently 
sought to bring a federal presence to bear in legislative areas where only the states 
previously had been active, or where federal presence had been limited. Accordingly, an 
examination of the preexisting state or federal programs is useful in understanding 
Congressional intent in introducing more comprehensive federal legislation. What 
shortcomings in the state programs prompted expanded federal involvement? Did Congress 
seek to replace entirely state regulation it considered ineffective? Or did it seek merely to 
supplement or unify a field of otherwise effective state law?
Key programs within the three statutes analyzed in this paper each reflect a different 
set of Congressional concerns with the body of preexisting law. The Clean Air Act in 1970 
took air quality standard-setting away from the states, making it exclusively a federal 
function. This expansion of the federal role reflected a Congressional judgment that the 
states had failed to develop effective regulatory schemes, as well as the belief that a 
uniform set of standards would be in the national interest.
The Clean Water Act provisions for discharge permitting represent precisely the 
opposite evolutionary course. In 1972, amendments to the federal clean water statute 
replaced a federal permitting scheme with the NPDES program, intended for the swiftest 
possible assumption by the states. This evolution reflected a Congressional judgment that 
the federal permitting program had been ineffective or inefficient, and that the states were 
best situated to carry out the permit process.
When Congress enacted RCRA in 1976, it wrote on a dean slate—at least insofar as 
federal law was concerned. In a field characterized by weak and erratic state legislation, 
Congress sought to establish nation-wide uniformity in standards for hazardous waste 
management and disposal, while enlisting the states' assistance in permitting and 
enforcement. The notion of nationally uniform standards was based in part on the highly 
mobile nature of hazardous wastes, and the desire to eliminate so-called "pollution 
havens'—the least stringent state regulatory environments that attract industries seeking to 




























































































D. Some Recurrent Patterns of Allocation
Several themes emerge from the functional allocations in the programs discussed 
above. The first is Congress's tendency to favor federal, national standard setting. This 
reflects the reality that the federal government's financial and technical resources enable 
it to conduct the research upon which standards (often health-based) are based. In 
addition, nationally uniform standards place states on an equal footing, avoiding the spectre 
of states competing for industry by enacting weak standards. The federal government 
makes one choice for all, and states are not left to regulate stringently at their own 
economic peril.
Permitting, on the other hand, is a function for which Congress often finds the states 
best suited. In issuing permits for water pollutant discharge and hazardous waste storage, 
states frequently had superior knowledge of local conditions, hydrogeologic regimes, and 
population patterns. Reliance on state implementation also avoided the need to create new 
federal bureaucracies.
More than the other administrative functions, enforcement is a role shared by both 
the federal and state agencies. Where a state has demonstrated an adequate ability to carry 
out a federal program, enforcement generally rests with the state in the first instance. This 
reflects the view that states presumptively are fully capable of bringing enforcement actions, 
and a desire by Congress to utilize state enforcement resources. Nevertheless, states often 
remain subject to local political pressures that may compromise vigorous enforcement. 
Accordingly, the federal government retains its enforcement powers, even where a state has 
been designated to carry out the core program. This "fail-safe" mechanism ensures that 
enforcement will take place, although commencement of a state action may preempt federal 
enforcement. In each of the three programs discussed in this paper, the EPA Administrator 




























































































III. The US Clean Water Act: The NPDES Permit Process
Federal-state interface under the US Clean Water Act occurs under several 
provisions, within several discrete program areas. Some examples include state 
promulgation of waste treatment management plans1, setting of water quality standards2, 
and issuance of permits for discharges of dredged or fill material.3 In addition, states play 
an absolutely central role under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permitting program under Section 402 of the Act. A discussion of this program 
follows.
A. State Assumption of the NPDES Permit Process
A central feature of the Clean Water Act is its strategy to control point-source water 
pollution through discharge permitting under the NPDES permitting program. Virtually all 
discharges into the nation's waters require a permit under this system. Although the Act 
authorizes EPA to issue discharge permits, a state may submit for federal approval a permit 
program it proposes to establish and administer under state law.4 If the program conforms 
with certain statutory requirements, EPA is required to suspend operation of the federal 
program in that state. Swift state assumption of the program was Congress's intent.
Once the permitting function has been assumed by the state, EPA retains a veto 
power over issuance of individual permits.5 In this respect, permit issuance remains a 
shared function. Enforcement against permit violations rests initially with the state, but 
EPA's enforcement authority remains unrestricted following its approval of a state permit 
program. EPA may, however, elect to give thirty days prior notice to the state to allow it 
to commence appropriate enforcement action.6
B. The Historical Context
Although the predecessor to the NPDES program had been federal in all respects, 
that predecessor was itself a marked departure from a long history of state primacy in water 
pollution control. The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972, which instituted the NPDES, 
were an attempt to restore state primacy. The legislative history surrounding the 
amendments contains an express Congressional recognition of the unique capacities of states 
in implementing federal law/
C. Standard-Setting Under the NPDES
Standard-setting under the NPDES program is both a federal and a state function. 
The Clean Water Act establishes nationwide minimum standards for pollutant removal by 
requiring application of increasingly stringent control technologies.8 The Act also requires 
each state to set water quality standards for waters within its jurisdiction.9 These two 
standards—the federal technology-based standard and the state environmental quality 




























































































NPDES permit.10 The permit effluent limitations are the ultimate enforceable standard 
under the NPDES program, and reflect the more stringent of the federal technology-based 
and state environmental quality standards.
D. Federal Approval of State Permit Programs
The Clean Water Act requires EPA to evaluate and approve each proposed plan if 
the state applies minimum effluent limitations in the permits it grants, and if it monitors 
and enforces the terms of the permits.11 The Agency's determination on this matter is 
reviewable in the US Court of Appeals.12
The legislative history documents an intent by Congress to confine EPA's discretion 
in approving state programs.13 The final bill, as amended, required the EPA Administrator 
to approve a state plan upon satisfaction of the express statutory requirements—a marked 
departure from a previous version which had merely authorized approval if the statutory 
conditions were met.
Congress's intent to hasten enlistment of the states in implementation is further 
demonstrated through provisions for "interim authorization" of existing state programs. 
Interim authorization was intended to allow continuance of existing state programs, so that 
in instances where states were active in their own right, their programs would not be 
displaced even temporarily by a federal analog.
Following approval of a state program, the federal role is reduced to four principal 
activities: 1) review of individual permits; 2) enforcement against individual permit violators; 
3) assessment of unaddressed violations for the purposes of withdrawing federal approval; 
and 4) review of the state program as a whole for the same purpose. These residual 
capacities are discussed in turn.
E. Review of Individual Permits
EPA's role concerning permit issuance is largely supervisory once a state NPDES 
program has been approved. If a state-issued permit does not comply with the 
requirements of the Act, EPA may veto the permit.14 Under the original bill before 
Congress, no permit could issue without either federal approval or an affirmative waiver of 
the right to object. In a House-Senate conference this requirement was changed to allow 
the state to issue a permit unilaterally unless EPA objected in writing or a complaint was 
received by another state. Moreover, EPA was allowed to object only on the basis of a 
published regulation or guideline, and not for a reason of general policy.15
F. Federal Enforcement Against Individual Permit Violations
The Clean Water Act provides EPA with a residual enforcement authority. A 
bifurcated procedure allows EPA either to proceed against a violator directly, or to provide 
notice of the violation both to the state and to the violator.16 If the latter course is taken, 
EPA must issue a compliance order or commence a civil action if the state does not 




























































































Congressional intent that EPA maintain a vigorous enforcement presence in states with 
-approvecLNEDESprograms with a mandatory duty to enforce in the absence of appropriate 
state action.17
G. Federal Assumption of Enforcement
When EPA finds permit violations under an approved state program to be so 
widespread as to indicate a failure of the state to enforce permit conditions or limitations 
effectively, EPA must notify the state.18 If the state failure to enforce continues beyond the 
thirtieth day after notice, EPA is required to enforce permit conditions by issuing 
compliance orders or initiating civil actions. This procedure—"federal assumption of 
enforcement'-continues until the state satisfies EPA that it will provide adequate 
enforcement.
The Clean Water Act's provision for federal assumption of enforcement is something 
of an anomaly, modeled on a similar provision in the Clean Air Act.19 Although it follows 
the language in the Clean Air Act provision virtually word-for-word, in the context of their 
respective statutes, the two provisions have significantly different effects.
Federal assumption of enforcement under the Clean Air Act serves primarily to 
unfetter EPA's enforcement powers. It removes from EPA's path a procedural obstacle 
that thirty days prior notice be given to the state and to the violator, as well as a 
requirement that the violation continue another thirty days beyond such notice.
The Clean Water Act places no similar restrictions on residual federal enforcement 
authority. In states with approved programs EPA always retains its  authority to enforce 
directly, without thirty days prior notice to the state and without regard to continuance of 
the violation. Thus, inclusion of the Clean Air Act provision makes little sense in the 
context of Clean Water Act residual enforcement authority.
H. Withdrawal of Program Approval
In addition to its authority to assume enforcement, EPA may withdraw approval of 
a state NPDES program not administered in compliance with the Act.20 Congress intended 
that this authority be exercised only in extreme situations, but that when necessary, 
"withdrawal shall be of the total program and not of bits, pieces, categories, or other 
parts."21 There is a requirement of ninety days notice, during which the state may correct 




























































































IV. State Implementation Plans Under the US Clean Air Act
The US Clean Air Act provides a role for the states under several provisions. These 
include: 1) state enforcement of federal emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants23; 
2) state enforcement of federally-promulgated performance standards for new stationary 
sources24; and 3) state standard-setting for emissions performance of existing sources.25 By 
far the most complex area of federal-state interaction, however, is the State Implementation 
Plan or "SIP" which provides for state implementation of federally-promulgated national 
ambient air quality standards.26 A discussion of the Clean Air Act SIP program follows.
A. The Role of the SIP
Foremost among the Clean Air Act's stated purposes is the protection and 
enhancement of the quality of the nation's air resources.27 This statement of purpose is 
incorporated into the Act immediately following Congressional findings that prevention and 
control of air pollution is primarily a responsibility of the states, but that federal leadership 
is essential for the development of cooperative state and federal pollution programs. 8 
The key Clean Air Act program tying the objective of air quality to federal-state 
cooperation is the State Implementation Plan.
The SIP is a mechanism by which Congress sought to utilize state resources to attain 
federally-set air quality standards. The Act requires EPA to promulgate national ambient 
air quality standards (NAAQS) for "criteria pollutants,"29 and directs states to adopt 
implementation plans to achieve the NAAQS.30 In practical terms, the SIP is the means 
by which a federal environmental quality standard is translated into an emission limitation 
enforceable at a pollution source under state law.
At the outset, several aspects of this scheme bear mention. First, the federal 
government has set the central environmental quality standards-the NAAQS-which the 
states are to achieve through, inter alia, permitting and enforcement under the SIP. 
Structurally, this represents the inverse of the Clean Water Act scheme discussed above in 
which states set environmental quality standards for intrastate waters—standards the federal 
government, at least in the first instance, seeks to implement through the NPDES 
permitting process and enforcement.
The SIPs, however, in addition to providing for permitting and enforcement, embody 
a substantial, if collateral, standard-setting component. For example, the Act requires that 
SIPs include emissions limitations, schedules, and timetables (including transportation 
controls, air quality maintenance plans, and preconstruction review of direct sources)-as 
necessary to ensure attainment and maintenance of the primary and secondary NAAQS.31 
Similarly, the Act requires that SIPs include provisions prohibiting stationary source 




























































































These state-set performance standards are ultimately "satellites" of the federal 
environmental quality standards: they relate primarily to procedure and implementation, 
and rely on the federal standards to give them definition. Although the SIP has the 
necessary components of a complete regulatory program-provisions for standard-setting, 
implementation through permitting, and enforcement-it is tied to the federally- prescribed 
air quality standards and cannot be considered truly independent of them.
B. The Historical Context
The advent of the SIP in the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments heralded a significant 
expansion of the federal role in controlling air pollution. Under the preexisting regulatory 
scheme, the 1967 Air Quality Act33, states were to achieve ambient air quality through 
implementation plans. The air quality standards, however, were to be adopted by the states 
in the first instance. The SIP retained the state role in implementation, but shifted to the 
federal government the task of setting the underlying standards for implementation.
C. Approval of a SIP
A proposed SIP that meets a series of substantive and procedural requirements is 
required to be approved by EPA within four months of submission.34 If the state fails to 
submit an adequate SIP, EPA is required promptly to prepare and publish an 
implementation plan for the state.35
Congressional intent in 1970 was to encourage states to design their SIPs around 
local needs and conditions. The legislative history confirms the drafters' intent to "give 
State and local authorities sufficient latitude in selecting ways to prevent and control air 
pollution."36 Thus, while the Act requires a state to demonstrate that it can afford a 
program, and that it will achieve national ambient standards within three years, it does not 
mandate specifics as to how each state should proceed. As a consequence, EPA has little 
authority or influence over the content of a SIP. The US Supreme Court has held that in 
reviewing a SIP, EPA has "no authority to question the wisdom of a State's choices of 
emissions limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of [the Act]."37 
Both houses of Congress clearly intended that SIP approval be mandatory upon satisfaction 
of explicit statutory requirements. Courts recognizing this intent have concluded that EPA 
may not reject a SIP on the basis of any other criteria, including economic or technological 
feasibility.
D. Federal Oversight of a SIP
Once a SIP has been authorized, EPA maintains an oversight role with respect both 
to the content and continuing adequacy of the SIP, and to SIP enforcement. There is no 
provision for withdrawal of SIP approval. When a state fails to enforce a plan effectively, 
however, EPA respond by "federal assumption of enforcement"-a procedure which expands 
federal enforcement authority by eliminating a requirement that thirty days prior notice be 




























































































A primary EPA oversight role concerns the need for SIP revision. Revision of a SIP 
may become necessary for several reasons. First, EPA's periodic review and revision of the 
NAAQS, as required by the Act, may necessitate a corresponding revision of the SIP. 
Independent of any NAAQS revision, EPA may find on the basis of new information that 
the SIP is "substantially inadequate" to achieve the NAAQS.39 Finally, the state may seek 
to promulgate changes in the SIP in response to new technology or to allow individual 
source variances.40
Any revision of the SIP requires an approval by EPA, although the Act is silent on 
procedures governing such approval. If the state fails to adopt necessary revisions to the 
SIP, EPA must revise the plan. A finding that a SIP is inadequate does not empower EPA 
to order the state to enact more stringent statutes or regulations. A federal appeals court 
has rejected the argument that EPA can compel state action, reasoning that Congress would 
have been explicit had it intended to "convert state legislatures into arms of the EPA."41
E. Enforcement Under the SIP—A Shared Function
As with other programs discussed in this paper, the Clean Air Act intends EPA to 
retain an enforcement authority, following approval of the submitted SIP. The federal role 
here is one of augmenting state enforcement efforts. Questions remain concerning the 
scope of federal enforcement authority, and the appropriate federal response once a state 
has initiated an enforcement action.
Prior to the Clean Air Act amendments in 1970, Congress had fashioned a much 
narrower role for federal enforcement. The 1967 Air Quality Act authorized the federal 
agency to bring suit for abatement of pollution presenting an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to public health, where state and local authorities had failed to act. In 
addition, the agency was authorized to bring suit to abate pollution that crossed state 
boundaries. But for intrastate pollution, the federal agency was authorized only to assist 
the state in judicial proceedings or to bring suit upon request of the state governor.42
The 1970 Clean Air Act amendments sought to expand federal enforcement 
authority. The report accompanying the Senate bill provided the following view on the 
need for expansion of the federal role:
The [existing federal clean air statute] recognizes that the primary 
responsibility for control of air pollution rests with State and local government.
While [the enforcement provision in the Senate bill] would restructure the 
enforcement authority available to the [responsible agency official], the 
Committee does not intend to diminish either the authority or the responsibility 
o f state and local governments. . . .  States would be expected to have or to obtain 
adequate authority to ensure that the provisions of the Act are enforced.
The Committee recognizes, however, that the authority under existing law 
has not been adequate to move quickly to abate violations o f standards. The 
Committee also recognizes that the provisions of existing law, although less than 
adequate, have not been used to the fullest extent practicable. The new authority 




























































































the necessary tools to act swiftly to abate violations o f the Act. The [responsible 
agency official] should not interfere with effective State action and should take 
into consideration any recommendations for abatement action which have 
resulted from existing enforcement procedures.
I f  the [agency official] should find that a State or local pollution control 
agency is not acting to abate violations of implementation plans or to enforce 
certification requirements, he would be expected to use the full force o f federal 
law. Also, [the official] should apply the penalty provisions o f this section to 
the maximum extent necessary to underwrite the strong public demand for 
abatement o f air pollution and to enforce compliance with provisions of the Act.
* * *
The [official] would be authorized to issue such an order when he 
determined that a State had not satisfactorily administered its enforcement 
authority under its implementation plan or when there was a violation o f federal 
standards.43
The Clean Air Act federal enforcement provision ultimately enacted modified the 
provision in the Senate bill in two principal respects. First, it deleted the requirement that 
the state have failed satisfactorily to administer its implementation plan prior to initiation 
of federal action. In this respect, EPA's legal authority to commence suit was enlarged. 
The second change was the introduction of a requirement for thirty days prior notice to the 
state and to the violator-a procedural constraint on EPA's authority to act. The legislative 
history provides little insight into these changes, which on their face, appear to have made 
residual federal enforcement authority independent of state failure to enforce the SIP, or 
otherwise to administer the statute adequately.
When acting to enforce a SIP, however, EPA is not entirely independent of the state. 
In finding a violation of a SIP, the EPA Administrator must "defer to the interpretation of 
the plan advanced by the state"44 so long as the state's interpretation is reasonable and 
otherwise consistent with the Act. In addition, an EPA finding of a SIP violation gives rise 
to a nondiscretionary duty to inform the state.
Despite these limitations, the US Court of Appeals has taken a broad view of the 
federal role: "Upon approval or promulgation of a state implementation plan, the 
requirements thereof have the force and effect of federal law, and may be enforced by the 
[EPA] Administrator in federal courts."45 EPA, then, retains authority to step in and 
implement federal air quality standards by enforcing approved state implementation plans.
F. Withdrawal of Approval and Federal Assumption of Enforcement
The Clean Air Act SIP provision does not provide for withdrawal of approval of a 
state implementation plan. This stands in marked contrast to state hazardous waste 
programs under RCRA and to NPDES programs under the Clean Water Act, authorization 
or approval of which can be withdrawn. This discrepancy may stem from the structure of 
the Clean Air Act which provides for a central state role at the outset. There is no federal 
implementation plan which precedes promulgation of a SIP; accordingly there is no 




























































































Moreover, when faced with an inadequate SIP, EPA is empowered to promulgate 
piecemeal revisions to bring the plan into compliance, obviating the need for authority to 
withdraw approval.
The closest analog to withdrawal of SIP approval is contained in a provision for 
"federal assumption of enforcement," available when EPA finds violations "so widespread 
that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State in which the plan applies 
to enforce the plan effectively."46 Before assuming enforcement, EPA must give the state 
notice of the problem and allow the state thirty days to improve its enforcement. If the 
state fails to take corrective action within this period, EPA may enforce any requirement 
of the SIP without providing prior notice to the state.
This period of federally assumed enforcement continues until the state satisfies EPA 
that it wil enforce the SIP. As with inadequacies in the content of the SIP, there is no 
provision for compelling the state to improve its enforcement; the state's showing must be 
"an act of voluntary cooperation rather than one made under the compulsion of a 
compliance order or civil action."47
Although the legislative history provides little insight into the assumption process, 
the language of the Act appears to contemplate a substantial showing of necessity before 
EPA may step in and assume full enforcement powers. As a general matter, EPA may act 
against individual violators after providing thirty days notice to the violator and the state. 
Federal assumption of enforcement removes this constraint. But a resort to expanded 
federal enforcement authority requires more than a showing of an unaddressed violation- 




























































































V. State Hazardous Waste Programs Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is the United States' 
principal regulatory statute for the management of hazardous waste.48 Enacted in 1976 as 
an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, RCRA was Congress's response to the 
increasingly severe threat to human health and the environment posed by the unregulated 
generation and disposal of hazardous waste. The Act closed the last major gap in the 
federal scheme for environmental regulation.
RCRA mandated a comprehensive national regulatory program for hazardous wastes 
embodying what soon came to be called a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory approach. It 
required EPA to impose a broad range of strict requirements on those engaged in the 
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste through standard-setting49, formulation 
of permit conditions and procedures50, identification of wastes as hazardous51, and 
institution of civil and criminal penalties to compel compliance.52
A. State Implementation of the Federal Program
Although the Act institutes a federal program, states are provided a central role in 
implementation. Each state is authorized to develop and implement its own hazardous 
waste program to operate "in lieu of' the federal program, upon a finding by EPA that such 
program is equivalent to the federal program.53 Upon authorization of a state program, the 
state assumes responsibility for permitting and enforcement. Setting of minimum standards 
remains entirely a federal function. EPA retains an enforcement role, but with an 
obligation to provide notice to the state before issuing compliance orders or commencing 
a civil action.
This allocation of function strikes a balance that is predominantly federal in 
character, in contrast to the other programs discussed in this paper. For example, the 
Clean Air Act SIP permits the states to set emissions standards for existing sources and 
affords relatively greater latitude in regulating to attain the federal air quality standards. 
Similarly, the Clean Water Act assigns to the states the task of setting water quality 
standards. Following approval of a state NPDES program, the Act has states set effluent 
limitations for individual sources as well. RCRA's hazardous waste provisions intend a 
more limited role for states. Minimum standard setting remains the sole province of the 
federal government. It need not follow, however, that in carrying out functions allocated 
to them (i.e., permitting and enforcement) the states are intended less discretion than in the 





























































































The House Report that preceded RCRA's passage in 1976 provides a compelling 
rationale for the policy of national uniformity in hazardous waste management.54 The 
Report describes at length instances of damage caused by then-current hazardous waste 
disposal practices. The Report stresses that the enumerated damages occurred in spite of 
the fact that most states had some regulatory power over hazardous waste. The ineffective 
state programs were also characterized by extreme diversity in approach.
In response to what it considered inconsistent and inadequate state regulation, 
Congress decided to enter the field and impose minimum standards that states would 
administer and enforce. The House Report describes the underlying policy thus:
The general purpose o f having federal minimum standards for hazardous 
waste disposal, with the option of state implementation of state programs 
equivalent to the federal program, is I) it provides uniformity among states as to 
how hazardous wastes are regulated; 2) it provides industry and commercial 
establishments that generate such wastes uniformity among states; 3) by providing 
such uniformity a state with environmentally sound laws does not drive business 
out o f the state to a state which, for economic reasons, decides to be a dumping 
ground for hazardous wastes; and 4) by permitting states to develop and 
implement hazardous waste programs equivalent to the federal program, the 
police powers of the states are utilized rather than the creation o f another federal 
bureaucracy to implement this act.55
C. Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Programs
RCRA's language suggests that Congress intended a minimum of agency discretion 
in the authorization process. Within ninety days following submission of a proposed state 
program, EPA is required to issue notice whether authorization is expected. A submitted 
state program is authorized by statute unless EPA determines, within ninety days after such 
notice, that it is not equivalent to the federal program, that it is inconsistent with the 
federal program or other state programs, or that it does not provide for adequate 
enforcement.56 Thus both the basis and the timing of EPA's approval are structured by 
statute.
The scope of EPA's discretion in making the determinations of equivalence, 
consistency, and enforceability is not well defined. The legislative history is silent as to the 
meaning of those terms; the House Report simply restates the language in the statute.57 
Nevertheless, the concerns of the Report mentioned above may be read as suggesting that 
Congress held a fairly broad notion of equivalency, and that it did not intend EPA to reject 
submitted state programs on the basis of minor objections. The discrepancies between state 




























































































A House colloquy, technically beyond the legislative history, confirms this view:
State requirements should be equivalent in overall effect to the Federal program,
without the necessity of showing point-by-point equivalence. . . .  It was not
Congress's intent to require States to xerox the Federal programs.58
D. Federal Enforcement of Authorized State Programs
RCRA departs from the oversight scheme under the Clean Water Act and the Clean 
Air Act in that it does not provide for federal assumption of enforcement. This discrepancy 
may reflect the fact that, unlike the other two statutes, RCRA does not allocate standard­
setting to the states. Therefore there is no reason to assume enforcement while leaving 
other functions in state hands. Put another way, by providing for federal assumption of 
enforcement, the other two statutes offer EPA a middle ground between simple exercise 
of residual federal enforcement authority and complete withdrawal of program approval. 
RCRA provides the Agency with a more limited set of options when faced with an 
inadequate state program.
Upon approval of a state hazardous waste program, EPA retains extensive 
enforcement authority. The Act provides that, for any hazardous waste violations, EPA 
may: 1) issue an order assessing a civil penalty; 2) issue an order requiring compliance; 3) 
revoke or suspend a permit; or 4) commence an action for a civil penalty, an injunction, or 
other appropriate relief.59 Where the violation occurs in a state with an authorized 
program, EPA is required to give notice to the state prior to issuing an order or bringing 
suit.
RCRA's concurrent federal-state enforcement scheme raises numerous questions 
about the coordination of federal and state enforcement efforts. As a policy matter, the 
preclusive effect of state enforcement has crucial implications for the character and 
intensiveness of EPA's oversight. If an enforcement action taken by a state preempts 
subsequent action under EPA's residual enforcement authority, EPA has an enormous 
interest in the adequacy of the state action.
At least three potential bases exist for preclusion of federal enforcement by a prior 
state action. They are: 1) statutory preclusion; 2) federal abstention doctrines; and 3) 
principles of res judicata. Because RCRA expressly contemplates federal enforcement in 
authorized states, and does not tie such activity to the absence or inadequacy of state 
enforcement, it is apparent that no statutory basis exists for preclusion.
Res judicata principles-which bar relitigation of a question resolved by a final 
judgment on the merits-are more troubling in their implications for a federal action after 
state enforcement. The matter awaits further resolution in the courts.
E. Withdrawal of Authorization
RCRA requires EPA to withdraw authorization of a state program that is not 




























































































corrective action within a reasonable time after notice. The Act contemplates an oversight 
function, but by its terms appears to relate more to program administration and 
enforcement than to the substantive provisions contained in the state program. RCRA's 
legislative history, however, takes a relatively expansive view of the oversight function, and 
makes it clear that EPA must also monitor the content of an authorized program:
[I]/ the state program is not equivalent, or becomes not equivalent after 
it is authorized, the Administrator, after notice and opportunity for the State to 
have a hearing, is authorized to enforce the federal minimum standards relating
to such hazardous waste program in such state.
*  * *
Therefore, a state retains the primary authority to implement its hazardous 
waste program so long as such program remains equivalent to the minimum 
federal standards.60
This expansive view is appropriate. Because states are expressly authorized to 
impose standards more stringent than federal minimum standards, the relationship between 
the two programs is dynamic. This is also true because federal standards themselves are 
open to periodic revision. These factors give rise to a continuing need for oversight of 
program content.
The administration and enforcement of the state program provides a second focus 
for EPA oversight. The statute provides little insight into the nature and intensity of EPA 
oversight, requiring simply that state administration and enforcement be in accordance with 
the Act.
The legislative history also is inconclusive but offers some guidance. The House 
Report states that where "violations of the Act are occurring and the state fails to take 
action,"61 EPA may step in and commence enforcement. Although this language concerns 
EPA's residual enforcement powers, it may be argued that the existence of unaddressed 
violations is intended to prompt EPA enforcement-not withdrawal of program 
authorization. This view is bolstered by the fact that the language quoted follows directly 
a discussion of program inequivalency, a situation for which withdrawal of authorization is 
the specified course of action.
The policy underlying RCRA's federal-state scheme is to utilize state police power 
to enforce federally-prescribed minimum standards. Even when supported by substantively 
equivalent statutory authority, state enforcement efforts inevitably will differ from those 
EPA might have taken. As a consequence, EPA may afford considerable latitude to state 
enforcement decisions. Such latitude comes at little expense because EPA has not given 
up its power to enforce on a case-by-case basis.
By contrast, and in light of the statutory requirements for program equivalency, the 
content of state programs may call for closer scrutiny. Still, the requirement of equivalency 





























































































The foregoing review of federal-state relations under US environmental regulatory 
programs reveals several themes. First, Congress has, on the whole, valued national 
uniformity in standard-setting. Each of the three Acts surveyed contains provisions setting 
national technology-based or environmental quality standards. The Clean Air Act created 
national standards for ambient air quality; the Clean Water Act imposed national 
technology-based standards for new sources; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act set national minimum requirements for management of hazardous waste. Congress 
sought to guarantee all citizens fundamental levels of environmental quality, and, by setting 
minimum technology standards, to prevent states from bidding for industry by tolerating lax 
regulatory environments. The federal government was seen as best placed to carry out the 
scientific research necessary for setting many of these standards. And although the laws do 
not say so expressly, national requirements for "best available technology" act as incentives 
for development of new technologies by ensuring a national marketplace for innovations.
A second theme is Congress's recognition of the states' unique capacities with 
respect to implementation. Each of the statutes provides a central role for state permitting 
and enforcement. The Clean Air Act SIP called on states at the very outset to assume an 
active role. No cautious withdrawal of a ''federal implementation plan" accompanied 
authorization of the SIP. Similarly, the Clean Water Act reinstated traditional state 
primacy in water law, and through an interim authorization process sought to avoid 
displacement of ongoing state permitting programs. RCRA afforded states somewhat less 
control, perhaps, but sought nonetheless a prompt transfer of the federally-designed 
program. Clearly the states have been seen as best situated for the day-to-day 
administration of environmental regulation.
As for state enforcement, Congress has been more equivocal. In general there has 
been an effort to utilize the states' police powers where doing so would not jeopardize the 
integrity of the federal program. But the same political factors that conspire to create 
"pollution havens" through lax regulation also exert a compromising effect on state 
enforcement. As a result, EPA always retains some residual enforcement capacity, and, 
under two of the statutes, is authorized to "take back" the enforcement function from the 
states through a process of federal assumption.
The European Community has long afforded its member countries relative freedom 
in implementing Community Directives on environment. Directives are binding on EC 
members, but their implementation has largely been left to the national governments. 
Although, the Commission legally holds more coercive power over EC members than does 
the US federal government over the states, as a practical matter it has been unable to 
undertake the kind of close environmental oversight that EPA exercises. As the EC moves 
more squarely into the environmental arena this is likely to change; the US balance 
between localized implementation and a strong federal enforcement presence may present 




























































































Perhaps the most likely area of controversy in 1992 will be the issue of uniform 
Community environmental standards. If rigidly interpreted, the mandate to remove trade 
barriers may undercut an equally vital policy favoring stringent environmental regulation. 
The Community requirements for consensus in the past have led to "lowest common 
denominator" regulation-especially given the diversity of member states. The practice of 
some countries to legislate over and above EC standards may be challenged as a barrier 
to trade.
Here the US experience may offer some guidance. The Commerce Clause of the 
US Constitution prohibits the American states from enacting legislation that will impede 
interstate commerce or lead to what has been called "economic Balkanization." The 
parallels to EC policy are fully apparent. Stringent environmental regulation by individual 
American states, however, cannot be successfully challenged under the Commerce Clause 
if the legislating state can demonstrate a legitimate question of public welfare that cannot 
be protected in a less restrictive manner.
Flexibility is similarly protected in the statutory context. The federal move toward 
national uniformity has been through the use of minimum standards, generally leaving the 
states free to regulate more stringently than the federal requirements. Even under RCRA, 
which calls on states to establish programs "equivalent" to the federal program, flexibility 
has been allowed. In this respect, the US system has sought to provide a regulatory floor, 
letting its diverse member states serve as a "laboratory" for new and more stringent 



































































































7. S.Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
8. CWA §301 (b).
9. CWA §303(a).
10. CWA §§ 301, 302, 402(a)(1).
11. CWA §402(b).
12. CWA §509(b)(l)(D).
13. House consideration of the Conference Report, October 4, 1972, reprinted in 
Legislative History at 261.
14. CWA §402(d).
15. Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1977).
16. CWA §309(a)(l).











































































































33. Publ. L. No. 90-148 (1967).
34. CAA §110(a)(2).
35. CAA §110(c).
36. 116 Cong. Rec. S42386 (1970)(statement of Sen. Muskie).
37. Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).
38. CAA §113(a).
39. CAA §110(a)(2)(H)(ii).
40. See Train supra.
41. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
42. See Air Quality Act at §108.
43. S.Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1970).
44. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Power and Light Co., 395 F. Supp. 313 
(W.D. Wis. 1975).
45. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 211 (8th Cir.), affirmed, 427 U.S. 246 (1975).
46. CAA §113(a)(2).


































































































54. H.R.Rep. (hereinafter House Report) No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 17-24 (1976).
55. House Report at 30.
56. RCRA §3006(b).
57. House Report at 29.
58. 129 Cong. Rec. H9154 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983).
59. RCRA §3008.
60. House Report at 31-32.
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